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I. INTRODUCTION: THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The original Wagner Act' is now a familiar page in labor history.
Passed in 1935, it guaranteed the right of employees to organize, to
be represented by a union of their choice, and to bargain collectively
through that union. It forbade employers to engage in certain prac-
tices, defined as "unfair labor practices," which would frustrate the
employees' rights under the Act. And it set up the National Labor
Relations Board [hereinafter referred to as NLRB] to enforce and
administer the statute. The original Act did not contain any prohibi-
tions against union activities and it did not forbid the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement from including in the contract a pro-
vision requiring employees to join a union.
* William R. Darcy, General Counsel, Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations.
J. Larry Foy, Assistant General Counsel, Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations.
Fleming James, Jr., Chairman, Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations; Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law; Sterling Professor Emeritus
of Law, Yale Law School.
John W. Kingston, Agent, Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations.
Because this article is written by persons intimately connected with the Connecticut
State Board of Labor Relations and in a position to participate in or to influence future
decisions of that Board, the authors do not feel free to suggest future rulings or direc-
tions that the Board may take. Future decisions must await the litigation process which
will give the Board the benefit of briefs and arguments made by parties in the concrete
context of actual cases. The authors believe that the Board's obligation to future litigants
and to the ideals of due process prevents it from making the psychological commitment
involved in taking even tentative positions on questions that have not yet actually been
decided and may be presented in future cases. Accordingly, this article scarcely touches
upon the peculiar problems that will be presented by the Act Concerning Collective
Bargaining for State Employees and the Act Concerning School Board-Teacher Negotia-
tions, statutes under which the Board has rendered few decisions. Because the great
bulk of the Board's decisions in the past twelve years has concerned the Municipal
Employee Relations Act, the emphasis of this article will be on this Act and decisions
under it.
1. The official title is National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (cur-
rent version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 to 157 (1970)).
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In 1945 the Connecticut General Assembly enacted the State
Labor Relations Act 2 [hereinafter referred to as SLRAJ, modeled after
the original Wagner Act, which had not then been amended in any
way to change the salient features noted above. The SLRA created
the State Board of Labor Relations [hereinafter referred to as the
Board] and gave it functions similar to those of the NLRB.
In 1947 Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendments, 3 which
modified the Wagner Act by introducing unfair labor practices on the
part of unions and by placing limitations on the right of the parties to
contract for a requirement that employees join the union. Bills em-
bodying these and other Taft-Hartley provisions were introduced in
the Connecticut General Assembly at several sessions but were not
adopted. 4 To this day the SLRA remains essentially what it was at the
beginning-a baby Wagner Act.
In 1965 the General Assembly enacted the Municipal Employee
Relations Act5 [hereinafter referred to as MERA] which extended
to employees of local governmental units rights similar to those con-
ferred on private sector employees by the SLRA. The MERA differed
from the SLRA in several important aspects. For example, the
MERA forbade certain kinds of conduct on the part of unions by
introducing the concept of "prohibited practices"6 on the labor side.
It did not, however, limit the right of the contracting parties to in-
clude in their agreement a requirement of union membership or
some similar clause.
The MERA departed from private sector statutes so as to ac-
commodate essential differences between public and private sector
bargaining. For example, a significant part of public sector collective
bargaining is political in nature. Recognizing that the public must pay
through taxes for collective bargaining agreements with public em-
ployees, the MERA leaves the ultimate control of the purse strings in
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-101 to llb (1977) (originally enacted as Supp. 1945
§ 933h to 946h). The SLRA applies only to employees in the private sector whose
employer's business is not large enough to bring it under the NLRB's jurisdiction. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-101(7) (1977).
3. The official title is Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 to 157 (1970)). The amended statute is called
the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the legislative history may be found
in (1947] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1135 et seq.
4. See, e.g., bills cited in Local 1303, Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Em-
ployees (AFL-CIO) Council No. 4, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1371 (1976).
5. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-460 to 479 (1977).




the hands of elected representatives. Bargaining is to be conducted
by the chief executive officer of a municipality, but if an agreement
made with the union requires additional funds, the request for such
funds must be submitted to the representative body of the municipal-
ity. This body may "reject such request as a whole" and return the
matter to the parties for further bargaining. 7
Another departure made by the MERA from private sector stat-
utes relates to the handling of impasse in bargaining. Traditionally,
private employees may strike and employers may use economic
weapons such as going out of business. Public employees, on the
other hand, are forbidden to strike,8 and municipalities can scarcely
go out of business. The MERA originally sought to solve the impasse
problem by providing for mediation and factfinding if the parties
were unable to agree within a reasonable time.9 But the factfinder's
report and recommendations were advisory only. Although these rec-
ommendations often provided a catalyst for the parties' agreement,
they were sometimes rejected by one or both parties, thus necessitat-
ing further bargaining. 10 Dissatisfaction with this provision led to
Public Act 75-570, which provides for compulsory arbitration of issues
which remain unresolved after factfinding.11
In 1975 the General Assembly enacted a labor relations statute
covering state employees' 2 [hereinafter referred to as State Em-
ployees' Act]. Although this statute was largely patterned after the
MERA, there are some differences: the State Employees' Act has no
provision for compulsory arbitration; it has a different definition of
appropriate units;1 and it requires members of a bargaining unit who
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-474(b) (1977). Where the legislative body is the town meet-
ing, the agreement by the selectmen binds the town and the board of finance. Id.
8. Id. §§ 5-279, 7-475, 10-153e(a).
9. Id. § 7-473.
10. Professor Joseph Glasser of the University of Connecticut School of Business
Administration is conducting a study of the correlation between the faetfinder's report
and recommendation and the settlement of labor disputes. He has reported to the au-
thors that more than 80% of the disputes were settled in accordance with the fact-
finder's recommendation. The average length of delay between the completion of the
factfinder's report and the settlement of the dispute is not yet available.
11. 1975 Conn. Pub. Acts 75-570, §§ 6, 7 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-473(c),
7-474 (1977)). This act also makes changes in the factfinding process, which has been
retained as a condition to compulsory arbitration. In particular, the faetfinder's report
will become binding if it is not rejected in writing within a specified time. Id. § 3.
12. Collective Bargaining for State Employees, 1975 Conn. Pub. Acts 75-566 (cod-
ified at CONN. GEm. STAT. §§ 5-270 to 5-280 (1977)) [hereinafter referred to as State
Employees' Act] (1977).
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-275 bids the Board to take into consideration both the
effects of over-fragmentation and the fact that the state will be bargaining on a statewide
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do not join the union to pay to the union the equivalent of union
dues and charges "as a condition of continued employment." 14
In 1976 the jurisdiction of the Board was extended to public
school teachers when their representatives were given recourse to the
State Labor Relations Board in prohibited practice cases. 15 This stat-
ute prohibits both the employer and employee organization from en-
gaging in practices similar to those prohibited by the MERA.'r6
Under all of the state statutes, except the Teachers' Act,' 7 the
Board has jurisdiction over elections for the choice of representatives
and over complaints of unfair labor practice, or prohibited practice.
The Board's jurisdiction over elections empowers it to determine ap-
propriate bargaining units, conduct elections through its Agent, 18 and
decide upon questions regarding the eligibility of any person whose
vote is challenged.
The Board has three regular members and three alternates. 19 All
petitions for election and all complaints presented to the Board are
basis. These directions, absent from the other state labor statutes, have resulted in the
establishment of units by regulation rather than on the case-by-case basis that the Board
has employed under the other statutes.
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-280(a) (1977).
15. An Act Concerning School Board-Teacher Negotiations, 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts
76-403 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-153a to 156d (1977)) [hereinafter referred to
as the Teachers' Act]. Public school teachers have had the right of collective bargaining
since 1961, but the statute granting them this right contained no definition of prohibited
practices and provided no machinery for policing the conduct of employers who might
seek to frustrate collective bargaining. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(b) (1977) [herein-
after referred to as Teacher Negotiation Act], prohibits certain practices by an employer.
And subsection 10-153e(c) prohibits similar practices by an "organization of certified
professional employees or its agents." Subsection 10-153e(e) authorizes complaints of
prohibited practices to be made to the Board and subsections 10-153e(e)-(i) describe the
Board's procedures for processing such complaints.
16. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(b), (c) (1977). There are some differences. The
MERA expressly prohibits refusal to discuss grievances and refusal to comply with griev-
ance settlements or arbitration awards. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-470(a)(5), (6), (b)(3)
(1977). The Teachers' Act does not contain these exact prohibitions but does forbid
refusal to participate in mediation or arbitration, and forbids certified professional em-
ployees or agents to solicit or advocate support from students for union activity. Id.§10-153e(b)(5), (c)(5).
17. The Teachers' Act does not give the Board jurisdiction over elections. CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 10-153b, -153 c (1977).
18. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
19. The Fiscal Note attached to 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts 76-403 appropriated funds for
three additional alternate members of the Board which have not yet been appointed.
The statute provides for alternates in such number and for such periods of time as the
governor may determine necessary, but no longer than six months. CONN. GEN, STAT.
§ 31-102 (1977). 1977 Conn. Pub. Acts 77-610(b) created the positions of Counsel and
Assistant Counsel to the Board, effective Oct. 1, 1977.
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heard by a panel of three, comprising members or alternates.20 There
are no hearing officers. There is an Agent of the Board and five Kssis-
tant Agents.21 The Agent or an Assistant Agent investigates -all peti-
tions and charges or complaints, holds informal conferences regarding
these matters with the parties, and mediates all questions upon which
agreement may be possible.22 In this way many disputed questions,
or entire cases, are settled and the work of the Board kept (though
barely) within manageable limits. Finally, the Agent decides what
cases or issues should be presented to the Board either by issuing a
complaint or by making a report recommending hearing of a party's
complaint.2 3
II. CONNECTICUT LABOR RELATIONS DECISIONS
The law developed by the NLRB and the federal courts under the
original Wagner Act and later under the Labor Management Relations
Act has been the subject of a substantial body of legal writing. 24 Since
Connecticut's statutes are in many ways patterned on these fedenl
statutes, the Board and our state courts have relied heavily on federal
decisions as guides to the interpretation of these state statutes. 25
20. The alternates, when they sit, have the same powers is regular members. CoNN.
GEN. STAT. § 31-102(b) (1977). The Board's regulations provide that two members shall
constitute a quorum. STATE BD. OF LABOR RELATIONS, CONN. DEP'T OF LABOR. REcL'
LATIONS § 7-471-30 (1975). As a matter of policy, however, ever' effort is nade to pro-
vide a three-person panel for each hearing, and the Board is reluctant to compel parties
to submit a case to two members.
21. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-102(a), -103 (1977).
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-103 (1977); STATE BD. OF LABOR RELATIONS. CONN.
DEP'T OF LABOR, REGULATIONS § 31-101-7 (1975).
23. Under the SLRA it is the Agent's function to issue complaints; the pairties file
charges with the Board which are automatically referred to the Agent. CoNN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 31-103, -107(a), (b) (1977); STATE BD. OF LABOR RELATIONS, CONN. DEP'T OF
LABOR, REGULATIONS §§ 31-101-14 to -22 (1975). Under the MERA, however. it is the
parties who file the complaint which the Agent investigates and reports upon to the
Board. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-471(1)(A) (1977); STATE BD. OF LABOR RELATIONS.
CONN. DEP'T OF LABOR, REGULATIONS §§ 7-471-19 to -20 (1975). Under the State Em-
ployees' Act the procedure is the same as that under the MERA. CONN. CEN. STAT.
§ 5-274(a) (1977). The procedure under the Teachers' Act is similar to that under the
SLRA. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(e) (1977).
24. See, e.g., Bowman, An Employer's Unilateral Action-An Unfair Labor Prac-
tice?, 9 VAND. L. REv. 489 (1956); Christianson & Suanoe. Mfotive and Intent in the
Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and Fictice Formality, 77
YALE L.J. 1269 (1968); Cox & Dunlop, The Ditty to Bargain Collectively During the
Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1097 (1950); Murphy, Tile National
Labor Relations Board-An Appraisal, 52 MINN. L. REV. 819 (1968); &-bin, Fibreboard
and Determination of Bargaining Unit Work: The Search for Standards in Defining the
Scope of Duty to Bargain, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1971).
25. See, e.g., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. DeCourcy. 162 Conn. 566. 579. 295
1977] 519
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Thus there are large areas in which labor law parallels federal law.
These areas will not be the subject of this article except where the
adoption of a parallel rule involves problems peculiar to public sector
bargaining. Here we shall deal largely with those areas in which the
Board's decisions differ from those of the NLRB,26 or where they
deal with problems of public sector bargaining that have no counter-
part under the national statutes.
A. Differences Not Attributable to Unique Nature of
Public Employment
1. Procedural Differences
Fundamental differences in the structure and operation of the
NLRB and the Board, and consequent differences in the procedures
adopted by them, are shown in one of the most recent and interest-
ing cases the Board has decided. The case arose under the SLRA and
involved two corporations that performed different functions at the
Plainfield dog track.27 Together they employed about five hundred
people.2 8 In February and March 1976 several unions filed petitions
with the Board seeking representation elections. At the first hearing
the employers argued that the evidence would show they had a col-
lective bargaining agreement with Local 402 of the Dolls, Toys, Play-
things, and Novelties Union (Race Track Division), AFL-CIO, cover-
ing the employees in the units claimed on the petitions. State law,
like federal law, bars an election "during the term of a [valid] written
A.2d 526, 534 (1972); New Canaan v. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations, 160
Conn. 285, 291, 278 A.2d 761, 764 (1971); Windsor v. Windsor Police Dep't Employees
Ass'n, Inc., 154 Conn. 530, 536, 227 A.2d 65, 67-68 (1967); Imperial Laundry, Inc. v.
Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations, 142 Conn. 457, 460, 115 A.2d 439, 440-41
(1955).
26. In a recent decision the Board said:
We do not believe ...that acceptance of federal decisions should be blind.
When there are differences either in the statutes or in other important condi-
tions which face the federal and the state boards, or when the federal decisions
do not seem best to effectuate the policies of state statutes, then we believe
that a state board should be free to fashion its own rules to accommodate Its
own different problems.
Connecticut Yankee Catering Co., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1480, at 6 (Jan.
13, 1977) (dictum).
27. Id.
28. The NLRB will ordinarily take jurisdiction over businesses with as large a gross
volume of business as these, and with this number of employees, but has declined to
take jurisdiction over dog racing tracks. See Volusia Jai Alai, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1280
(1975); NLRB RULES AND REGULATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE, SEIIES
8, AS AMENDED, 29 C.F.R. § 103.3 (1976).
(Vol. 9:515
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collective bargaining agreement." 29
The petitioners claimed that they would prove that Local 402
never in fact represented a majority of employees, that the racetrack
attempted to foster and assist Local 402 to become the bargaining
agent for the employees, and that the contracts set up as bars to the
petitions were what is known in labor relations as "sweetheart" con-
tracts and therefore invalid.
The racetrack and Local 402 objected to the Board's hearing any
evidence tending to negate their contract bar defense on the ground
that such matters can be considered only in an unfair labor practice
proceeding. 30 The Board overruled this claim of law, but both the
employer and Local 402 continued to press it vigorously at all subse-
quent hearings.
Under national substantive law the facts claimed by the petition-
ing unions would invalidate the contract,3 ' but under NLRB proce-
dures no facts which tend to show an unfair labor practice may be
interposed in representation proceedings, even when such facts are
offered to avoid a contract bar defense to the petition.32 A corollary
to this rule is that the NLRB will presume the legality of a collective
bargaining agreement. 33
There was no unfair labor practice charge or complaint filed
against the employers. The Board concluded that it would not there-
fore impose the sanctions peculiar to unfair labor practice proceedings
29. In the municipal section it is prohibited by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-471(1)(B)
(1977) and in the private sector by Board decision. See, e.g.. Loehinann Chevrolet Co.,
State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 306-A (June 30. 1954). For the NLRB rule see
Leonard Wholesale Meats, 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962).
30. Representation proceedings are authorized by CONN. GE,. STAT. § 31-106
(1977), unfair labor practice proceedings by § 31-107. The procedures under each are
separately outlined in the Board's general regulations. STATE BD. OF LABOR RELA-
TIONS, CONN. DEP'T OF LABOR, REGULATIONS §§ 31-101-3 to 13 (1975) govern
representation proceedings. Sections 31-101-14 to 32 govern unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings. There are some minor differences in the prehearing proctdure% and the (f-
ferences in remedies are substantial. If a representation petition ,ucceed,. ,n election
and possible certification result. If an unfair labor practice complaint %ttuceeuds. a cease
and desist order is issued in addition to other appropriate remedies such as the rein-
statement of an improperly discharged employee, the awarding of back pay, and the like.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-107(c) (1977).
31. Lenscraft Optical Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 836 (1970). Bowman Transp.. Inc.. 112
N.L.R.B. 387 (1955).
32. The Mengel Co., Corrugated Box Div., 114 N.L.R.B. 321 (1955), NLRB RULES
AND REGULATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE. SERIES 8. AS AMENDED. 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.18 (1976), OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB. AN OTLI.NE OF LAW A D
PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES 116 (1974).
33. Electro Metallurgical Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 1396 (1947).
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but that the facts which may constitute an unfair labor practice are
available in determining a different issue under a different procedure.
The Board reasoned:
It is an everyday occurrence in our law that facts which con-
stitute a crime may also constitute (or form constituent parts
of) a civil cause of action, or defense, or avoidance of a de-
fense. If they do so, these facts are freely available in the
civil action even though no criminal prosecution has been
instituted and even though the safeguards of criminal proce-
dure do not obtain in the civil proceeding ...
There is nothing, therefore, in our general law which
would preclude the petitioners here from avoiding respon-
dents' defense of contract bar by facts which have that legal
effect simply because those facts might also support other
remedies which must be pursued under different proce-
dures. Nor are the rules governing these other procedures
violated by such a practice any more than criminal pro-
cedural rules are violated by allowing arson to be shown as a
defense to a fire insurance claim. 34
The Board perceived that a principal reason for the NLRB rule is
the difference in procedure between representation cases and unfair
labor practice cases. It noted that NLRB decisionmaking authority is
statutorily divided among the office of general counsel, regional di-
rectors, and the NLRB itself. The responsibilities of these various
branches depend upon whether an unfair labor practice complaint or
a representation petition is involved. The intermingling of these pro-
cedures would create conflicts of interest which the statutes sought to
avoid. The Board understood that "[t]o enforce this allocation of deci-
sion making authority it is necessary to make a rule which requires
that unfair labor practice charges be raised only under the procedure
specifically created for their disposition. ' '35
The Board distinguished its own procedures from those of the
NLRB:
From the very beginning this Board has adopted a dif-
ferent set of procedures. Both representation and unfair
labor practice cases are regularly tried before the full Board
as adversary proceedings. All cases of both types are pre-
•34. Connecticut Yankee Catering Co., at 7.
35. Id. at 8. See Baltimore Transit Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 159, 162-63 (1944).
[Vol, 9:515
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sented to the Board by the parties themselves or their coun-
sel. The Agent has no role in this presentation. There is no
counterpart to NLRB's general counsel, or regional director.
At the Board hearings the rules of evidence are used its a
guide, and the atmosphere is not without formality though it
is less formal than in trials before a jury. There is no differ-
ence in any of these respects between representation and
unfair labor practice proceedings. 36
As a result, the Board has consistently "followed the procedure gen-
erally observed in civil litigation which allows all of the issues open
under the substantive law to be tried in a single proceeding. We
believe we should adhere to our own practice in this regard even
though it differs from that of the NLRB."3 7 Moreover,
this is peculiarly true here because the rule involved is pro-
cedural (rather than substantive) and because NLRB's pro-
cedural rule itself deviates from the whole trend of modern
procedure to accommodate a situation produced by peculiar-
ities in the organization and practice of NLRB which do not
obtain in this State.38
Since the NLRB forbids the introduction of facts in a representa-
tion proceeding that may be evidence of an unfair labor practice, it
also forbids inquiry into the validity of a contract urged as a bar to a
representation proceeding; its validity is presumed. 39 The Board re-
jected this presumption because it was unable to follow the broader
NLRB rule and because such a presumption "would afford insufficient
protection to the employees' rights under the Act to choose their own
representatives and tend instead to afford protection to fraud, collu-
sion between union and management, and other questionable deal-
ings at the expense of the employees."40
The Board found little merit to the presumption in the context of
the case before it;4 1 the presumption did not accord with the actual
36. Connecticut Yankee Catering Co., at 8 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id.
39. Electro Metallurgical Co., at 1399.
40. Connecticut Yankee Catering Co., at 9.
41. The facts surrounding the employer recognition of Local 402 presented a senous
question of credibility. The card count was made without checking the vadlidty of the
signatures on the cards; Local 401's business agent brought hoth the employer' list of
employees and the union cards to the card count; the employer's representative At the
card count was a nonlabor lawyer who was not informed that the card count would take
19771
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probabilities in a situation where the labor organization had not been
certified by the Board or shown to be the majority choice by a card
check conducted by the Board or in a manner which complies with
the Board's simple safeguards:
Nothing in our experience would justify a presumption on
this ground. If a presumption does not rest on probabilities
it is a legal fiction created to serve some substantive or pro-
cedural end. This explains it in the context of NLRB's struc-
ture but as we have pointed out this justification is al-
together lacking under our organization and procedure. 42
The Board concluded that Local 402 was not shown by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence to have been chosen by a majority of
employees to be their representative. Therefore, the contracts be-
tween the racetrack and Local 402 did not constitute a bar to the
elections sought by the petitioners, and elections were ordered to
take place.
2. Twenty Hour Rule
The Board has also differed from the NLRB on the question of
when it is appropriate to include part-time employees in the same
bargaining unit as full-time employees. The LMRA provides that a
majority of employees in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining
shall designate or select who shall exclusively represent them in the
bargaining process. 43 The SLRA, MERA, and the State Employees'
Act contain similar provisions. 44 Under the LMRA and the three
Connecticut statutes, it is the responsibility of the administering
board to determine in each case what an appropriate unit shall be. 45
The primary concern of each board in making unit determinations is
to group together only employees who have substantial mutual in-
terests in wages, hours and other conditions of employment. Stated
another way, the determining board decides whether the employees
place before the participants entered his office; and Local 4 02 's business agent testified
that he destroyed the union cards after the card count and that the employer's list "just
disappeared." Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 9.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
44. CONN. GEN. STAT. §9 31-106(a), 7-468(1)), 5-271(h) (1977), respectively.
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. 99 31-106(a), 7-471(3) and 5-275(b) (1977). However, CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 31-106(a) requires the Board to designate a craft unit as an appropriate
unit if the members of the craft so decide, and § 7-471(3) requires the Board to create a




share a sufficiently similar community of interests. 46
The NLRB exercises considerable discretion in deciding whether
full- and part-time employees share a community of interest sufficient
to warrant inclusion in the same bargaining unit. Some factors which
have been considered important include regularity of work, quantum
of work, nature of work, and similarity of pay scale. 47 These guide-
lines are quite broad and some cases which arrive at one conclusion
are difficult to distinguish from cases reaching the opposite
conclusion. 48 The Connecticut Board is also vested with discretion in
making determinations of appropriate units and the four factors listed
above are similarly important to the decisionmaking. The basic differ-
ence between the approach of the two Boards is in the application of
the second factor--quantum of work. 49
In 1948 the Connecticut Board departed from the NLRB when it
decided that there was a danger presented to full-time employees by
including in the same bargaining unit part-timers who worked less
than half time.50 The Board determined that part-time employees
often have a full-time job elsewhere and may have substantially less
of a stake in their second job than have full-time employees. Thus,
the Board concluded, the voting strength of the full-timers should not
be diluted by including in the same unit part-timers who work less
than fifty percent of the normal work week.51
In Norwich City Cab Co."5 2 the Board reconsidered the question.
The average work week for Norwich City Cab drivers was sixty
hours. The "fifty percent rule" would have excluded from the unit all
employees who did not average at least thirty hours weekly. The
Board recognized the unusual length of the employer's work week
and decided that the purposes of its fifty percent rule would be ful-
filled if the measure were applied to the then prevailing work week
46. C. MoRims, THE DEVELOPLNG LABOR LAW 39 n.4 (1971) citing 15 NLRB Ax:.
REP. 39 (1950). 21 CSBLR ANN. REP. 1, 2 (1965-1966); 1 CSBLR AE. REP. 3
(1945-1946). See State (Unit NP3) Administrative Clerical Employees. State Bd. of Labor
Relations Dec. No. 1466-A (Jan. 7, 1977).
47. C. Mo, ,s, supra note 46, at 212.
48. Id.
49. See Town of Thompson Bd. of Educ.. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 978.
at 3 (Mar. 17, 1971), rev'd on other grounds. Town of Thompson Bd. of Educ. v. Local
1303, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (Super. Ct. Windhain County,
1971).
50. Davidson & Leventhal, Inc., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 120 (Feb. 3.
1948).
51. Id.
52. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 366 (Dec. 29. 1955). See also 11 CSBLR
ANN. REP. 6 (1954-1955).
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of forty hours. As a result of Norwich City Cab, part-time employees
who work regularly and average at least twenty hours a week for a
period of weeks (usually thirteen) prior to the filing of the petition
have consistently been included in a unit with regular full-time
employees. 53
At the time of its creation, this "twenty hour rule" had no coun-
terpart in the labor relations law of any other state or in the federal
labor law. 54 Even the Connecticut rule did not continue without
modification. Careful exceptions were allowed where the danger to
full-time employees did not exist. Because hardship is often imposed
upon part-time employees when they are excluded from the unit, the
Board did not want to impose the twenty hour rule where it was not
necessary. In Yankee Silversmith Inn, Inc.55 virtually the entire labor
force was comprised of part-time employees. The Board declined to
apply the rule, believing that there existed no significant conflict be-
tween part-time and full-time employees and that, therefore, a com-
munity of interest existed. A second departure from the rule was
made where the employer himself had established a "sharp distinc-
tion" between regular part-time employees working at least sixteen
hours weekly and those working less. Those employees working at
least sixteen hours weekly were classified by the employer as "per-
manent part-time" employees and enjoyed substantial fringe benefits
not provided to those employees classified as "temporary part-
timers." 5 6 In Terminal Taxi Co.57 the Board responded to arguments
made by the employer that the twenty hour rule and its application
were arbitrary:
It is true that the twenty-hour rule is arbitrary in the same
sense that the rule terminating a person's minority at
twenty-one years is arbitrary. Whenever a line is drawn
problems appear in the borderland. Nevertheless the Board
finds that by and large those whose employment is substan-
tial as well as regular have a common interest in hours,
wages, and working conditions, and that their interests are
likely to differ materially from the interests of those who are
employed only a few hours a week, even regularly. The lat-
53. See cases cited in notes 49-51, supra.
54. Thompson Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 978, at 3 (Mar.
17, 1971).
55. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 429 (Dec. 3, 1956).
56. Norwalk Hosp., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 820 (July 22, 1968).
57. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 494 (May 11, 1959).
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ter tend to regard such employment as incidental, or a side
line. The Board also finds that the twenty-hour rule is a
reasonable one in the instant case and that it promotes sta-
bility and predictability in the administration of the Act to
apply it uniformly, except in very unusual circumstances.
The Board finds that such very unusual circumstances do
not exist in this case. 58
In Meriden-Wallingford Hospital59 the Board was confronted for
the first time with the issue of whether a unit comprised entirely of
employees who worked less than twenty, hours per week was an ap-
propriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining under the SLRA.
The Board had already noted the tendency of the twenty hour rule to
"disenfranchise" part-time workers,60 but had never stated whether
their disenfranchisement stemmed from the practical reality that a
union probably would not be interested in representing a small unit
of part-time employees, or from the notion that employees excluded
by the twenty hour rule were not employees within the meaning of
the Act and therefore excluded from collective bargaining altogether.
In Meriden-Wallingford Hospital61 the petition sought recognition of
a unit of nurses working less than twent, hours a week. The em-
ployer argued that they were not employees as defined by section
31-101(6) of the SLRA. 62 The Board found that employees working
less than twenty hours a week were not statutorily excluded from
coverage and that it did not have the discretionary power to exclude
them from the benefits of the SLRA. Because there could be no con-
flict between full-time and part-time employees in the claimed unit,
the Board found the unit appropriate. 63
Two of the Connecticut labor relations statutes have taken a
more restrictive view of whether a unit of employees who work less
than twenty hours a week is an appropriate unit. The MERA defines
an "employee" so as to exclude those working less than twenty hours
58. Id. at 2.
59. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1180 (Nov. 30, 1973).
60. Town of Thompson Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 978
(Mar. 17, 1971), rev'd on other grounds, Town of Thompson Bd. of Educ. v. Local 1303
Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (Super. Ct. Windham County, 1971);
Thompson Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 925 (May 12, 1970).
61. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1180 (Nov. 30, 1973).
62. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-101(6) (1977).
63. Meriden-Wallingford Hosp., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1180 (Nov.




per week. 64 Unlike the original twenty hour rule developed by the
Board under the SLRA, this MERA rule is a test of coverage rather
than a test for the appropriateness of a bargaining unit. The LMRA
has no counterpart to this rule. Read literally, this language allows no
room for the exceptions worked out under the SLRA, 65 or for a unit
like that in Meriden-Wallingford Hospital. Similarly, the State Em-
ployees' Act defines "employee" as excluding "part-time employees
who work less than twenty hours per week." 66
3. Parity Clauses
The validity of parity clauses has been one of the important is-
sues recently facing the Board. A parity clause in a collective bargain-
ing agreement binds the employer to give additional benefits to the
contracting union in the event that a later contract with another
union affords more favorable treatment than did the earlier con-
tract.67 Such clauses are occasionally found in the private sector, but
their principal use has been by unions representing firefighters in
order to raise their general wage level to that of policemen, who
were generally better paid. 68
In City of New London69 the Board noted that even in the ab-
sence of a parity clause the negotiator for a municipality "must con-
sider traditional and equitable relationships among the various groups
of its employees and it is a common practice for such negotiator to
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-467(2) (1977) provides as follows: "'[E]mployee' means
any employee of a municipal employer, whether or not in the classified service of the
municipal employer, except . . . part-time employees who work less than twenty hours
per week ......
65. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text. The Board initially came to a dif-
ferent conclusion, reasoning that the legislature must have intended to adopt the
Board-created rule with all its exceptions. Town of Thompson Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of
Labor Relations Dec. No. 978 (Mar. 17, 1971), rev'd on other grounds, Town of Thomp-
son Bd. of Educ. v. Local 1303, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (Super.
Ct. Windham County, 1971). The Board later overruled Thompson stating: "[O]n recon-
sideration . . . we feel the original decision was wrong since the language of the part
time exclusion of Section 7-467(2) of the Act is clear and unambiguous." City of New
Britain, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1201 (Feb. 14, 1974), aff'd, City of New
Britain v. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations, 31 Conn. Supp. 211, 327 A.2d 268
(C.P. 1974).
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-270(b) (1977).
67. See, e.g., Borough of Naugatuck (Fire), State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No.
1228 (June 5, 1974); City of New London (Police Department), State Bd. of Labor Rela-
tions Dec. No. 1128 (April 10, 1973).
68. Borough of Naugatuck (Fire); City of New London (Police Department), supra
note 67.
69. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1128 (April 11, 1973).
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stress the implications which any concession would have in terms of
similar demands by other groups. "70 The Board also observed that
even in the absence of a parity clause "there is a widespread but not
uniform tradition among American cities of observing parity in fact
between policemen and firemen." 71 Despite this tradition, the Board
found that the presence of a parity clause was particularly beneficial
to employees for two reasons: "(1) [I]t binds the city legally to give
firemen whatever is later given to policemen (within the scope of the
parity clause); (2) it requires that such concessions be made to the
firemen forthwith, even though their contract may have a year or
more to run." 72
Although the Board concluded that the parity clauses in question
were illegal, its holding was limited. In particular, the Board declined
to hold that parity between policemen and firemen was forbidden,
that the existence of a parity clause was in and of itself unlawful, or
that the police and fire units could not agree upon or bargain for
equal benefits. 73 However, the Board did find the clause under con-
sideration to be objectionable because of its inevitable impact on a
third party not participating in the collective bargaining discussions:
What we find to be forbidden is an agreement between one
group (e.g., firemen) and the employer that will impose
equality for the future upon another group (e.g., policemen)
that has had no part in making this agreement. We find that
the inevitable tendency of such an agreement is to interfere
with, restrain and coerce the right of the later group to have
untrammeled bargaining. And this affects all the later
negotiations (within the scope of the parity clause) even
though it may be hard or impossible to trace by proof the
effect of the parity clause upon any specific terms of the
later contract (just as in the case before us). The parity
clause will seldom surface in the later negotiations but it will
surely be present in the minds of the negotiators and have
a restraining or coercive effect not always consciously real-
ized.74
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 8.
73. See Local 1219, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Connecticut State Labor Relations
Bd., 38 CONN. L.J. No. 5, p. 3 at 5-6 (Aug. 3, 1976). This case was followed b) the New
York Public Employment Relations Board in City of New York, CoV*T EMtPLOYEE
RE:LATIONS REP. (BNA) No. 694, at 42 (Feb. 7. 1977).
74. Local 1219, Ass'n of Firefighters, at 9. Parity clauses are illegal subjects of bar-
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B. Problems Peculiar to the Nature of
Public Employee Bargaining
1. The Right of Free Speech and Political Action
Two important values in a democracy are freedom of expression
and its correlative, the public's right to know about all matters which
may bear on the decisions an individual may need to make in a free
society. 75 These complementary rights-to speak and to hear-have
been involved in recent Board decisions in several ways. For exam-
ple, one policy cuts across the field of private sector bargaining: the
Board has followed NLRB decisions which forbid electioneering
within twenty-four hours before an election begins.76
The interplay-and sometimes competition-between freedom of
speech and hearing on the one hand and the rights and policies pro-
tected by labor laws on the other, looms large in public sector bar-
gaining. Not only does public sector collective bargaining impinge
more directly on the public than does private sector bargaining, but
the final phases of public sector bargaining are left to the political
process. The first important decision within this area was Town of
Stratford.77 The town bad adopted an ordinance in 1971 requiring
the "initial entire salary and other proposals" in bargaining to be filed
with the town council and town clerk. 78 When the town negotiators
insisted on applying this ordinance to the bargaining proposals sub-
mitted at the next round of negotiations with some eight separate
unions, the unions brought prohibited practice complaints. The town
claimed that collective bargaining proposals fall within the public's
gaining because of their effect on third parties. An employer would be provided suf-
ficient protection if a parity clause were a permissive subject of bargaining because
he could refuse to discuss the subject matter with the union during negotiations for
a collective bargaining agreement. The third party union, however, would be ham-
pered in its negotiations by this rule of equality, even though it was not a party to the
agreement which created the rule. The only way to protect these third parties is to
void such clauses when they appear in a collective bargaining agreement.
75. "Freedom of discussion ... must embrace all issues about which information Is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
their period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
76. See State Dep't of Corrections, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No 1442 (Oct.
1, 1976); Town of Farmington Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1261
(Nov. 5, 1974); see also Bousa Motors, Inc., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 411
(July 31, 1956).
77. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1069 (May 30, 1972).
78. When filed with the town clerk these proposals would have become public In-
formation under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-19 (1977).
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"right to know" statute. 79 The Board held that such proposals did not
fall within this statute,80 and that the publicity to be given to ongoing
labor negotiations was a ground rule for bargaining, and itself a man-
datory subject of bargaining. The town's passing and seeking to im-
plement the ordinance without negotiation and over objection there-
fore constituted a failure to bargain in good faith and a violation of
the Act.
The Stratford case poses a question involving more than statu-
tory interpretation. Where, as in the usual case, the parties do not
agree to immediate publicity for bargaining proposals, this fact does
impede the free flow of information to the public about a matter of
legitimate concern. But such impairment or postponement may be
justified. The familiar testimonial privileges also impede the flow of
information. They represent a judgment that in some situations and
relationships the public interest is better served by encouraging free
and uninhibited confidential communication than by full public dis-
closure."' Speech and action become stilted and distorted when people
are operating in a goldfish bowl. Thus, the giving of a privilege against
disclosure involves a balancing of competing values, and it has been
the Board's judgment that the give and take needed for successful
bargaining would be seriously cramped by immediate publicity in
much the same way that deliberations of a jury or of judges would
be.82 The question whether such protection would be appropriate
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-19 (1977), the "right to know" statute, then read as fol-
lows:
Except as otherwise provided by any federal or state statute or regulation, all
records made, maintained or kept on file by any executive, administrative,
legislative or judicial body, agency, commission or any political subdivision
thereof, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or
regulation, shall be public records and every resident of tie state shall have the
right to inspect or copy such records at such reasonable time as may be deter-
mined by the custodian thereof.
80. The Board's judgment was later vindicated by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-19tb)(8)
(1977) which expressly exempts from the operation of the "right to know" statute "rec-
ords, reports and statements of strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bar-
gaining."
81. See 8 VIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Cf. id. § 2192
(duty to give testimony).
82. Cf. Town of Stratford, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1069 at 11 (May 30,
1972). But see City of Hartford, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1353 (Dec. 18.
1975), wherein the Board gave a narrow construction to an agreement not to make
statements to the public or news media "during negotiations regarding specific de-
mands on the bargaining table ... ." Id. at 2. The Board said:
Since the privilege for communications between bargaining parties creates a
pocket of secrecy in a field wherein public discussion should generally be free,
19771
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
after bargaining sessions have ended has not been presented.
In one respect the Board has found that the policies of the
MERA call for the fullest freedom of political expression and action.
Because the legislative body has the last say in deciding how much of
the taxpayers' money is to be spent for a negotiated labor agreement,
the final stage of public sector bargaining is committed to the political
process.8 3 A necessary corollary of this fact is that all parties con-
cerned must have wide latitude in entering the political arena to in-
fluence political action upon bargaining positions involving money.
The problem first came before the Board in City of Shelton. 84
While the mayor and the police union were deadlocked in bargain-
ing, the mayor put an advertisement in the local paper stating, in
effect, that (1) the union had taken a highhanded attitude in bargain-
ing, its president having declared that "management has no rights";
(2) the president had conducted a barrage of attacks upon the ad-
ministration, upon groundless claims; and (3) the union did not want
a professional police force dedicated to good performance but one
dominated by political influence or union pressure. The Board found
that the advertisement did not violate the MERA, at least in the
absence of a showing that the statements were knowingly false or
made in reckless disregard for their truth. 85 The Board reasoned that
"[t]o hold that it constitutes a prohibited practice for either side of a
municipal labor dispute to lay his case before the electorate comes
perilously close to violating the First Amendment."8 6
This approach was followed in City of Hartford8" where the
union complained of certain statements made by city councilmen dur-
ing the course of negotiations conducted in a period of financial diffi-
then an agreement to exercise that special privilege should be narrowly con-
strued so that it will not encroach unnecessarily on the public's right to know
which is the essence of the First Amendment and a cornerstone of a free demo-
cratic society.
Id. at 4.
83. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-474(b) (1977) provides:
[A] request for funds necessary to implement such written agreement and for
approval of any provisions of the agreement which are in conflict with any char-
ter, special act, ordinance, rule or regulation adopted by the municipal em-
ployer ... shall be submitted . .. to the legislative body which may approve or
reject such request as a whole by a majority vote of those present and voting on
the matter ....
84. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1344 (Nov. 26, 1975).
85. Id. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86. City of Shelton, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1344 at 8 (Nov. 26, 1975).
87. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1353 (Dec. 18, 1975).
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culty for the city. The challenged statements included expressions of
opposition to tax increases, of preference for wage cuts over layoffs,
and the like. The Board dismissed the complaint, noting the political
nature of the final stages of public bargaining and declaring that
"when a council member tells his constituency how he stands on a
matter which will properly come before the council for action, he is
saying what he has a right to say and (more important) what the pub-
lic has a right to hear." 88 The Board suggested that if a union thinks
the views of the legislature are impolitic or benighted, the remedy is
to be sought through political means, not by gagging the legislator. 89
The interest of the union in free expression was presented in
City of Stamford,90 wherein the city sought to impose sanctions on
members of the firefighters' union for engaging in political activity in
violation of a city ordinance. During a mayoralty election campaign,
the union had put an advertisement in the paper opposing the in-
cumbent mayor because of his stance in pending negotiations with
the union. The Board held that the city violated the MERA by en-
forcing the ordinance in this situation. The Board noted its recent
Hartford decision and continued:
This reasoning is not a one way street; what is sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander. We clearly recognized in
the Hartford case that "the way to counteract [unfavorable
statements by a legislator] is by political means" and that
public employees must put up with public attitudes in a
democracy "if the employees cannot change the attitude by
political means." If the people control the purse strings in
the last analysis then it is part of the bargaining process to
try to persuade the people to loosen them and under our
system this is done through the ballot-by voting for officials
and legislators who will be more likely to accede to or com-
promise with union demands.
From this it follows that political activity may well be
an integral part of the bargaining process. It is so where it is
directed toward the election of officials and legislators who
are thought to (more or less) be favorable to union demands
in pending labor negotiations. When political activity is of
this kind it is protected by the Act; it is among the "con-
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id.
90. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dee. No. 1421 (July 23. 1976).
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certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining"
which employees have the right to engage in "free from ac-
tual interference, restraint or coercion." Section 7-468(a).
From the above reasoning it becomes clear that the sec-
tions of the Stamford charter which forbid employees to en-
gage in political activity and the attempts to enforce those
sections which were made in this case constituted actual in-
terference with an activity protected by the Act and, there-
fore, practices prohibited by the Act. 91
2. Impasse in Public Sector Bargaining
Final impasse is the point at which the parties are deadlocked in
bargaining so that further negotiation is futile. 92 The impasse problem
is not the same in the public and private sectors. 93 The difference has
given rise to a problem in the public sector that has been the subject
of the recent Board decision in City of Willimantic.94 The NLRB has
long had a rule that unilateral action by an employer upon a manda-
tory subject of bargaining currently under negotiation constitutes an
unfair labor practice whether that action consists of conferring or
withdrawing a benefit. 95 This rule has had a limited application to
unilateral changes made during the term of a contract. 96 The Board
has consistently followed this line of decisions. 97 However, the NLRB
rule has always been subject to a limitation: after final impasse in
bargaining the employer is free to make unilateral changes in existing
conditions which were previously offered to the union but which the
union has rejected.98 The NLRA does not forbid unilateral action as
such, but only action that violates the statute in some other way-
91. Id. at 4.
92. Dallas Gen. Drivers Local 745 v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1966); NLRB v.
Intracoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1961).
93. See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
94. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1321 (Aug. 1, 1975).
95. The leading case is NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1967). See notes 105-107 infra
and accompanying text regarding subjects within "managerial prerogative."
96. Bowman, An Employer's Unilateral Action-An Unfair Labor Practice? 9 VAND.
L. REV. 487, 507 et seq. (1956); Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively Dur-
ing the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1116 et seq. (1950).
97. See, e.g., City of Hartford, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1425 (July 28,
1976); Town of Hamden, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1044 (Feb. 23, 1972);
see also Newington Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1116 (Mar. 22,
1973).




here by refusal to bargain. 9 9
The Board has adopted the NLRB's impasse rule as part of its
unilateral action rule, in both the private and the public sector, and
has consistently included in its orders to cease and desist from unilat-
eral action a provision that the order is effective only until final im-
passe is reached. 100 In the aspects of public sector bargaining for-
merly committed to their initial jurisdiction, our state courts have
also followed both lines of NLRB decisions.' 0 '
In City of Willimantic10 2 the Board for the first time found an
impasse to exist in the municipal sector. There the union challenged
the applicability of the impasse rule to public sector bargaining, urg-
ing that the employer's right to take unilateral action after impasse in
the private sector is a correlative of the employees' right to strike and
that it should not therefore be transplanted to the public sector,
where employees are forbidden to strike. The Board rejected this
contention and applied the impasse rule. In doing so the Board con-
sidered both the history of the bargaining (including a former deci-
sion holding that impasse had not been reached at that time) and the
straitened financial condition of the city in the light of the Act's ex-
press provision that the obligation to bargain "shall not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.'
10 3
The Board based its decision on statutory construction. It recog-
nized that although there might be a rational ground for adopting a
different rule in public sector bargaining, the legislature had not done
so. The Board concluded that the General Assembly must have
known of the NLRB's impasse rule and the strong tendency of the
Board and our courts to follow federal construction of labor relations
statutes; the Assembly made express provision for handling impasse
in the original Act and again in 1975, yet on neither occasion did it
seek to preclude the application of the NLRB's final impasse rule to
the situation. Moreover, the Board indicated that there is nothing in
the history of the federal impasse rule to suggest that the NLRB
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
100. See, e.g., City of Waterbury, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1343 (Nov.
26, 1975) ( I of Order); City of Willimantic, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1321
(Aug. 1, 1975) ( I of Order); Town of East Haven, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec.
No. 1279 (Jan. 27, 1975) ( I of Order).
101. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 596-600 (1972).
See also Principals' & Supervisors' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., No. 199135 (Super. Ct. Hart-
ford County, Nov. 20, 1976).
102. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1455 (Nov. 23, 1976).
103. Id. at 4-5 (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7-470(c) (1977)).
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adopted it in order to give employers a right which would be recip-
rocal to the employees' right to strike. 10 4
3. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining
In administering the federal statutes the NLRB has developed
the concept of mandatory subjects of bargaining-a concept based on
the statutory obligation to bargain collectively with respect to wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment. 10 5 This contrasts with the
concept of managerial prerogative under which management need not
bargain about decisions which "lie at the core of entrepreneurial con-
trol" even though they may have an indirect effect on wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment. 108 In the early days of the
104. Id. It may well be that impasse will not occur in cases subject to the com-
pulsory arbitration provisions of 1975 Conn. Pub. Acts 75-570. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 7-473a to 473c(e) (1977).
105. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). Items which
the Connecticut Board has recently found to be mandatory subjects of bargaining In-
clude: Subcontracting, Southington Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No.
1221 (May 10, 1974), Plainville Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No.
1192 (Jan. 18, 1974); a substantive change in a method of computing pensions, City of
Norwich, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1239 (July 11, 1974); general terms and
conditions of retirement, pensions and disability plans, Town of Hamden, State Bd. of
Labor Relations Dec. No. 1277 (Jan. 16, 1975); terms and conditions of clothing allow-
ance, college incentive programs and step increments, City of Danbury, State Bd. of
Labor Relations Dec. No. 1291 (March 21, 1975); requirement of a doctor's certificate
for sick leave, City of New London, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1307 (May
30, 1975); transfer of a bargaining unit employee to a position in a nonbargaining unit,
Housing Auth. of Meriden, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1308 (May 30, 1975);
impingement upon the work schedule of individual officers caused by creation of a new
shift, City of Bridgeport, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1319-A (Nov. 4, 1975);
hairstyle rules and attachment of a penalty to an existing rule, City of Waterbury, State
Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1320 (July 31, 1975); amount of deductions withheld
from employees' pay when the deductions are not mandated by state or federal law,
Town of East Haven, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1337 (Oct. 15, 1975); re-
troactivity of benefits, City of Willimantic, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1338
(Oct. 15, 1975); transfer of bargaining unit work to nonbargaining unit employees, West
Haven Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1363 (Jan. 30, 1976); elimi-
nation of gasoline furnishment, City of Stamford, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No.
1473-A (Jan. 5, 1977); compensation to be paid to bargaining unit employees given tem-
porary promotions, Board of Police Comm'rs, Town of Hamden, State Bd. of Labor Rela-
tions Dec. No. 1484 (Jan. 27, 1977); secondary effect upon workload or safety conditions
of bargaining unit employees when other employees are reassigned, City of Bridgeport,
State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1485 (Jan. 24, 1977); residency requirement for
municipal employment, City of Bridgeport, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1500
(Feb. 10, 1977).
106. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217, 223 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring). Items which the Connecticut Board has recently ruled to be within the
area of managerial prerogative include: Decision to establish a new division within an
existing department, Town of East Haven, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1279
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NLRB, employers argued for a broad interpretation of managerial
prerogative and strongly resisted what they regarded as inroads upon
the inherent rights of management. As the Connecticut Supreme
Court has noted, however, the decisions of the NLRB and the federal
courts "have consistently expanded the number of items which fall
within the penumbra of the phrase 'other conditions of employ-
ment.' "107
This problem has its counterpart in public sector bargaining. Stat-
utes vest various public bodies with broad powers to control depart-
ments under their jurisdiction. Boards of education and of police or
fire commissioners, for example, often guard the powers vested in
them with a protective jealousy reminiscent of the private employers'
attitude toward management prerogatives in the early days of the
Wagner Act. However, collective bargaining statutes do, to some ex-
tent, invade the fields once reserved for management or statutory
prerogative, and the Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized that
such labor laws "divest boards of education of some of the discretion
which they otherwise could exercise.' 0 8 This change has been a hard
pill to swallow for conscientious administrators bred in an older
school of thought, particularly in agencies with a paramilitary, tradi-
tion like police and fire departments.' 0 9 But if, as the Board believes,
public employee bargaining is here to stay, the administrators' at-
titude is likely to change as time goes on.
Board decisions on mandatory subjects of bargaining have closely
followed NLRB rulings and the pattern set by the Connecticut Su-
(Jan. 27, 1975); decision to institute an extra shift, City of Bridgeport, State Bd. of Labor
Relations Dec. No. 1319-A (Nov. 4, 1975); rules that policemen shall not (1) include
false or inaccurate information on reports; (2) fabricate, withhold or destroy evidence;
(3) directly or indirectly seek gifts, presents or gratuities; (4) seek or accept rewards or
compensation for service rendered or expense incurred in the line of duty; (5) convert
lost, found or stolen property of the city for own use; (6) make recommendations to a
prosecutor or court concerning the disposition of a case pending in court; (7) "mark,
alter, mar or deface any printed or written notice, memorandum, general rules or direc-
tive relating to police business ...." City of New Haven, State Bd. of Labor Relations
Dec. No. 1342 (Nov. 18, 1975); elimination of a position, creation of a new position,
creation of a new program, West Haven Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec.
No. 1363 (Jan. 30, 1976); decision to lay off for budgetary reasons, City of Waterbury,
State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1436 (Aug. 31, 1976); reassignment of employees
to other duties within same job classification, City of Bridgeport, State Bd. of Labor
Relations Dec. No. 1485 (Jan. 24, 1977).
107. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566. 582, 295 A.2d
526, 535 (1972).
108. Id. at 584, 295 A.2d at 536.
109. See Board of Police Comm'rs of New Haven v. White, 38 CoNN. LJ. No. 11. p.
18 (Sept. 14, 1976).
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preme Court in West Hartford Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. DeCourcy.110 In
DeCourcy, a case involving teachers, the Connecticut Supreme Court
imported much of the federal labor law on this topic into Connecticut
public sector labor relations. The court determined that the scope of
negotiations should be relatively broad and sufficiently flexible to ac-
commodate the changing needs of the parties. Accordingly, police
rules and regulations as to many items have been held within the
field of mandatory bargaining." 1' In Town of East Haven,112 the
Board reasoned as follows:
As DeCourcy recognizes there is an area of overlap between
what have traditionally been thought managerial functions
and what concerns conditions of employment for the em-
ployees. In drawing the line within that area between those
items that must be bargained over and those which the em-
ployer may act on without bargaining, a balance must be
struck. And in striking it the tribunal should consider, we
believe, the directness and the depth of the item's impinge-
ment on conditions of employment, on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, the extent of the employer's need for
unilateral action without negotiation in order to serve or
preserve an important policy decision committed by law to
the employer's discretion.113
Nonetheless, the Board believes DeCourcy makes clear that the duty
to negotiate does not deprive the employer of the power to take uni-
lateral action when negotiation has failed.
In the recent case of City of New Haven114 the Board recognized
that in the public sector the concept of managerial prerogative neces-
sarily becomes intertwined with public policy. 115 By executive order,
the mayor of New Haven required municipal employees to file an
affidavit disclosing their financial interests in firms doing business
with the city. The Board concluded that in view of the sanctions
likely to result from employee noncompliance, that is, dismissal or
discipline, the filing of the affidavit was a major condition of employ-
ment. But this did not lead to the conclusion that the matter was a
110. 162 Conn. 566 (1972).
111. Town of East Haven, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1279 (Jan. 27,
1975).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 6 (original emphasis deleted; authors' emphasis added).
114. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1490 (Jan. 28, 1977).
115. Id. at 4.
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mandatory subject of bargaining. The Board held that the affidavit
requirement was not a mandatory subject of bargaining because
"[t]he employees' interest in not disclosing the information is out-
weighed by the strong public policy against employees having private
interests conflicting with their public duties."'116
4. Conflict Between the Bargaining Obligation
and Civil Service Systems
Civil service systems present a dilemma unique to the public
sector. Although civil service systems are designed to eliminate polit-
ical patronage and assure selection and promotion of personnel on the
basis of merit, these objectives are compromised to the extent that a
union is allowed to bargain over the content and implementation of
civil service rules. Unions have interests, such as the preservation of
the seniority system, which may directly conflict with the principles
of civil service. On the other hand, the extension of civil service into
areas of traditional union concern is a threat to the unions' right to
bargain collectively.
The legislature has resolved this dilemma in the municipal sec-
tor, enacting legislation that provides in part: "The conduct and the
grading of merit examinations, the rating of candidates and the estab-
lishment of lists from such examinations and the appointments from
such lists and any provision of any municipal charter concerning polit-
ical activity of municipal employees shall not be subject to collective
bargaining."1 1 7
An interpretation of this section was involved in Town of Strat-
ford (Police).'1 8 In Stratford the union objected to the town's unilat-
eral change in the basis for promotion in the police department. The
town claimed that the subject of promotion was not a bargainable
item under section 7-474(g). The town urged that the charter desig-
nated the office of town manager as personnel agency and that a civil
service system had been set up administratively. The Board found,
however, that this system had not been "established by statute, char-
ter or special act to conduct and grade merit examinations and to rate
candidates in the order of their relative excellence ..."119 as section
7-474(g) requires. Because this provision created an exception to the
MERA's broad purpose of ensuring collective bargaining on matters
116. Id. at 5.
117. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7-474(g) (1977).
118. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1241 (July 19, 1974).
119. Id. at 4.
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within its scope (including bases for promotion), the Board thought
the exception should be construed strictly to cover only those cases
within its literal terms. There must be not only an agency which
applies civil service principles, but the agency must be "established
by statute, charter or special act.' ' 2 0
In the case of City of New Haven (Fire and Police)121 a civil
service system was undisputedly in existence. The unions contended
that a resolution of the civil service commission requiring all candi-
dates for promotion in the police and fire departments to submit to
agility tests was a unilateral change in violation of the city's duty to
bargain. Because section 7-474(g) provides that "[t]he conduct and
the grading of merit examinations . . . shall not be subject to collec-
tive bargaining," the Board held that the prohibition against unilat-
eral changes does not apply because the change was on a subject
which was not a mandatory subject of bargaining.' 22 The unions ar-
gued that the exemption for the grading of examinations does not
permit a city to make any part of the examination (e.g., a physical
agility test) a condition of eligibility for promotion. The Board re-
jected this argument, noting that the "authority to conduct and grade
examinations has traditionally, both in academe and in the civil ser-
vice, included the authority to decide what weight to give to indi-
vidual parts of the examination.' ' 2 3
In Town of East Haven (Board of Education) 24 the town created
and implemented a civil service system during the term of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement with a union representing custodians. The
civil service rules for filling of vacancies conflicted with the provisions
of the contract. Nevertheless, the Board held that section 7-474(g)
exempted the town's actions from the duty to bargain with the union.
Civil service rules arose in a different context in Board of Police
Commn'rs, Handen.'25 The town had a civil service commission, and
rule 9(2)(c) provided that "the Civil Service Commission may au-
thorize temporary appointment, not to exceed five (5) months, to a
vacancy in any position class pending examination . 1. " 26 This rule
was in existence prior to the then current collective bargaining
120. Id. at 4-5.
121. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1256 (Oct. 28, 1974).
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id.
124. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1093 (Nov. 1, 1972).
125. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1484 (Jan. 24, 1977).
126. HAMDEN, CONN., RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COM-
MISSION, Rule 9 § 2(c) (effective Oct. 9, 1974) (publication of Town of Hamden).
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agreement between the town and the police union. There was
nothing in that contract which conflicted with rule 9(2)(c). Nor was
there an established practice of the parties which contradicted the
language of rule 9(2)(c). The management rights clause in the contract
was broad and unspecific, but it did retain for the town the rights to
manage that the town previously possessed. Dismissing the union's
complaint regarding the town's refusal to bargain collectively on the
issues of temporary transfers and promotions, the Board concluded:
"In this situation, Rule 9(2)(c) represented the status quo which the
Town could implement when the need arose. There was no unilateral
change in conditions of employment so the Town's contract did not
violate the Act."'127
5. Contract Bar; Timely Filing of Petition
Both the NLRB and the Board will ordinarily refuse to order a
new election during the effective period of an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement. 128 This is known as the contract bar rule; its pur-
pose is to promote stability in labor relations. Both Boards recognize,
however, that the desire for stability should not prevent employees
from exercising their right to choose a new representative when
deep-seated and longstanding dissatisfaction with an incumbent union
has developed. To protect this right both Boards have developed
time periods for the filing of representation or decertification peti-
tions in cases where the contract bar rule would apply. However, the
Connecticut Board's time limits are different from those of the
NLRB, and this difference is largely due to unique characteristics of
public sector bargaining.
The NLRB's rule is fairly rigid; it allows a petition to be filed
between ninety and sixty days before the expiration of an existing
contract, and at any time after expiration if no new contract is
made. 129 The Connecticut Board's rule under the MERA is more
flexible. It allows a petition filed either (1) within thirty days before
the time when negotiations for a successor contract would normally
127. Town of Hamden Bd. of Police Comm'rs, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No.
1484 at 4 (Jan. 24, 1977) (emphasis in original) (citing City of New London, State Bd. of
Labor Relations Dec. No. 1417 (1976)).
128. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
129. Leonard Wholesale Meats, 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962). Since Leonard the NLRA
has been amended to include health care institutions and the NLRB has ruled that for
that particular type of business petitions filed not more than 120 days or less than 90




begin where such time is fixed by the existing contract, by past prac-
tice, or, perhaps, by statute,' 30 or (2) after a notice requesting nego-
tiations but before such negotiations actually begin.' 3 ' However, the
Board will disallow a petition filed after the expiration of a contract if
negotiations for its successor were begun in time and are being pros-
ecuted with reasonable diligence by the incumbent union.132
In Town of Manchester33 the Board identified the different
needs in the public sector and began developing a new approach to
meet those needs. The Board noted that both national and state
boards agreed on the basic notion that "the appropriate time for a
petition for an election is in that period prior to the end of the con-
tract when a change in the bargaining representative can be most
smoothly effectuated with the least disruption of the bargaining
process."'13 4 The Board agreed that the NLRB's rules were well
adapted to serve that purpose in private sector bargaining, but con-
tinued:
Collective bargaining in the public sector raises differ-
ent considerations. Experience during the last two years has
suggested that the bargaining process in public employment
is often more protracted than in private employment. This
means that bargaining for a new contract may begin longer
in advance of the end of the contract term. If there is to be
a change of the bargaining representative, that change can
be most smoothly made at the time when contract negotia-
tions would normally begin. Therefore, a petition filed
130. Town of Manchester, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 813 at 5 (July 11,
1968).
131. City of New London, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1297 (April 24,
1975); Town of Westport, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1232-A (June 25, 1974).
The Board has found that, under unusual circumstances, there may be other proper
times for the filing of a petition. See, e.g., City of Norwich, State Bd. of Labor Relations
Dec. No. 804 (May 14, 1968) (petition filed five months and one day before expiration of
existing contract held timely; effective date of new contract coincided with beginning of
fiscal year and required early negotiations in order that collective bargaining mesh
smoothly with city's budget-making process); City of Hartford, State Bd. of Labor Rela-
tions Dec. No. 971 (Jan. 8, 1971) (petition filed five months and eight days before expi-
ration of existing contract held timely under facts similar to City of Norwich). In a more
recent case, the Board held that a wage re-opener in a contract cannot create it contract
bar. Bridgeport Housing Auth., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1420 (July 22,
1976).
132. Town of Wilton, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1263 (Nov. 22, 1974);
City of Shelton, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1065 (May 5, 1972).
133. State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 813 (July 11, 1968).
134. Id. at 3.
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somewhat more than ninety days prior to the end of the
contract would be at an appropriate time. Our experience is
too limited to now fix limits with certainty, but we are pres-
ently persuaded that a petition filed as much as four months
prior to the end of that contract should not be considered
premature.
Collective bargaining in the public sector often requires
quite different time limits for filing petitions for another
reason. Collective agreements are often timed to expire at
the end of the fiscal year. In that case, the parties usually
contemplate that negotiations for a new contract will be held
while the budget is being prepared so that when the budget
is presented and adopted, it will reflect the costs of the new
collective agreement.
Where the collective bargaining process is thus coordi-
nated with the budget-making processes, the normal time
for beginning negotiations may be as much as five or six
months before the end of the contract term. This time is
considered necessary to complete negotiations, get the re-
sults of the negotiations reflected in the budget and have
the budget adopted before the end of the fiscal year. A peti-
tion filed for a change of representatives at the time when
negotiations for a new contract normally begin, cannot be
considered to be premature. On the contrary, it might well
be considered to be at the most appropriate time. It would
avoid having negotiations disrupted in midcourse by a
change of bargaining representatives. 135
All of the cases referred to above were decided before the legis-
lation of 1975 which mandates a timetable for the beginning of and
certain other steps in negotiation 36 and also provides that an existing
contract shall continue in effect during negotiations for its successor. 137
The Board has not yet decided how this legislation affects the time
for filing petitions for election or decertification.
III. CONCLUSION
Public employee bargaining and its peculiar problems stand at
the frontier of labor law today. The law in this field has much in
135. Id. at 4-5.
136. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7-473(b) (1977).
137. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7-475 (1977).
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common with private sector bargaining where the National Labor Re-
lations Board has built up a substantial body of law, but the overlap is
far from complete. Where the public sector presents different and
unique problems, the law needed to meet them is being developed
largely by state legislatures and state boards. The Connecticut ex-
perience described in this article represents a part of this developing
labor law. 138
138. A particular problem in the public sector at this stage of development is the
lack of published decisions by state labor boards. Thus the decisions cited in this article
cannot be found through normal research methods. The Board is seeking to remedy this
problem through a grant application under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of
1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4701 to 4772 (1970), which is administered by the U.S. Civil Service
Commission. Hopefully, through regional cooperation, a New England data-base for
public sector labor relations will be developed in the near future.
